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Abstract
As is well-recognized, market dominance is a typical outcome in mar-
kets with network e!ects. A rm with a larger installed base o!ers a more
attractive product which induces more consumers to buy its product which
produces a yet bigger installed base advantage. Such a setting is investigated
here but where rms have the option of making their products compatible.
When rms have similar installed bases, they make their products com-
patible in order to expand the market. Nevertheless, random forces could
result in one rm having a bigger installed base in which case the larger rm
may make its product incompatible. We nd that strategic pricing tends
to prevent the installed base di!erential from expanding to the point that
incompatibility occurs. This dynamic is able to neutralize increasing returns
and avoid the emergence of market dominance.
2
1 Introduction
Products with network e!ects face the following conundrum: Consumers
benet most when one technology dominates but then the market is likely
to be controlled by a single rm and thereby su!er from the usual deadweight
welfare losses associated with market power. But dominance of a technology
need not imply monopoly. It is possible to have the best of all worlds if
competing rms choose to make their products compatible. In that case,
consumers reap maximal benets of network e!ects, while competition is
preserved.
These issues are well-known and lie at the heart of the Microsoft case. In-
deed, one proposed structural remedy was to divide the Windows monopoly
into several companies which would initially have compatible (in fact, identi-
cal) products.1 The argument for such a solution was explained by Levinson,
Romaine, and Salop (2001, pp. 139-140):
The new Windows competitors would begin with totally com-
patible products. Although the new Windows companies sub-
sequently could choose to drastically deviate from this standard
and create highly incompatible products, they are unlikely to do
so. ... Unlike the current system, where the Windows monop-
olist cannot be punished by the market for being incompatible
with its much smaller rivals, one of three WinCos likely would be
severely punished by applications developers and users if it cre-
ated a signicantly incompatible version. This would also reduce
the likelihood of “tipping” back to a monopoly.
While this argument is plausible, it is far from obvious in light of the
complexity and subtlety of dynamic competition in markets with network
e!ects. A more formal analysis is required to understand the circumstances
under which competitors would mutually decide to make their products
compatible. There is, of course, an extensive literature on markets with
network e!ects - superbly reviewed in Farrell and Klemperer (2006) - and
some of that research endogenizes product compatibility, in particular, Katz
and Shapiro (1986), Economides and Flyer (1998), Cremer, Rey, and Tirole
(2000), and Tran (2006).2
1These Microsoft clones have been colloquially dubbed “Baby Bills” which is a play
on the term Baby Bells which is itself a colloquialism for the Regional Bell Operating
Companies created with the break-up of the Bell System in 1984.
2Research by Farrell and Saloner (1992) and Choi (1996, 1997) allows consumers to
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The standard model in that literature is a two stage structure; in the
rst stage, rms make compatibility decisions and, given products are or are
not compatible, they then engage in price or quantity competition (for either
one or two periods). Consistent with the Microsoft setting, both rms must
agree for their products to be compatible. There are two primary forces
that inuence whether or not compatibility occurs in equilibrium. First,
compatibility enhances the value of rms’ products by increasing network
e!ects. As this draws more consumers into the market, rms have a mutual
interest in making their products compatible. Second, when rms have dif-
ferent installed bases, the larger rm loses an advantage with compatibility.
In contrast, the smaller rm always prefers products to be compatible since
it benets through both e!ects. Existing work has shown that if rms are
not too di!erent - either in terms of installed bases or other traits - then
products are compatible.
Though highly similar rms may then choose compatibility, the criti-
cal question not addressed by previous work is whether this is stable over
time. Even if identical rms were to choose compatible products and thus
achieve a symmetric equilibrium in the product market, randomness in de-
mand and other shocks would surely lead to asymmetric market shares and
thus asymmetric installed bases. At that point, the rm with the larger
installed base may no longer desire compatibility. Of course, if rms are
locked into their products being compatible then the larger rm cannot act
on that desire. In practice, however, compatibility is not permanent; a rm
can alter its technology and thereby make its product incompatible. The
unanswered question then is: How stable are compatible products? Could
a modest di!erence in installed bases induce the current market leader to
choose incompatibility in a march towards dominance? Or are there forces
that maintain incentives for compatibility?
To address these questions, we develop and numerically analyze an in-
nite horizon model of competition for a market with network e!ects. In
each period, two rms decide on rst compatibility and then price. Demand
and customer turnover are stochastic which means that rms are very likely
to end up with asymmetric installed bases even if they begin identical and
choose compatible products. A Markov Perfect equilibrium is characterized
and we assess the frequency with which market dominance occurs.3
purchase converters which deliver compatibility. In our setting, converters are not available
which would seem appropriate for the Microsoft case.
3The closest paper in style to ours is Markovich (2000). Though she also computes a
Markov Perfect equilibrium for a market with network e!ects, she does not consider the
decision of rms regarding compatibility which is central to our research questions. Other
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The paper’s main result is the discovery of a dynamic that can neutralize
increasing returns and prevent market dominance from emerging. As long
as network e!ects are not too strong, rms that begin with comparably sized
installed bases will choose to make their products compatible. Furthermore,
if the installed base di!erential should grow - even to the point that the
larger rm makes its product incompatible - the smaller rm prices aggres-
sively to reduce the di!erential and thereby maintain or restore product
compatibility. Since compatible products can then be stable in the long-
run, this means that market dominance need not be the eventual outcome
in markets with network e!ects.
2 Model
Though motivated by the proposed structural remedy for the Microsoft case,
our interest lies more broadly in understanding the stability of competition
in markets with network e!ects when compatibility is endogenous and rms
can dynamically price to achieve dominance. This is reected in the more
general character of the model we have developed.
2.1 State Space and Firm Decisions
The model is cast in discrete time with an innite horizon. Though our
attention in this paper is limited to when there are just two rms, the model
will be described for the more general case of ! " 2 rms. These rms sell
to a sequence of heterogenous buyers with unit demands. At the start of a
period, a rm is endowed with an installed base which represents consumers
who have purchased its product in the past. Let "! # {0# 1# $ $ $ #%} denote
the installed base of rm & at the start of a period where % is the maximal
size of the installed base.
Given ("1# $ $ $ # "") # rms engage in a two-stage decision process in which
they choose compatibility in stage 1 and then price in stage 2. In stage 1,
each rm decides whether or not to “propose compatibility” with each of
the other rms. Let '!# # {0# 1} be the compatibility choice of rm & with
respect to rm ( where '!# = 1 means “propose compatibility.” To actually
achieve compatibility requires that both rms propose it. Thus, the tech-
nologies of & and ( are “compatible” i! '!# · '#! = 1$ Requiring both rms
to consent is consistent with a number of markets including those involved
dynamic analyses include Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2005) and Llobet and Manove (2006)
though again they do not allow rms to choose compatibility.
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in the Microsoft case. Furthermore, the analysis promises to be more inter-
esting than when a rm can, by itself, make its product compatible. After
compatibilities are determined, rms simultaneously choose price. Let )!
denote the price of rm &.
This is clearly a stylized modelling of compatibility but should serve
our purposes well. Our primary interest is in understanding the incentives
for compatibility and that means learning when rms prefer compatibility.
We have then given them maximal exibility by ignoring any technical con-
straints and assuming compatibility is costless to change. Furthermore, this
modelling approach means that compatibility is not a state variable and this
is important in keeping the dimensionality of the state space manageable.
2.2 Demand
Demand in each period comes from the replacement of some randomly
selected old consumers (who previously purchased) with new consumers.
There is one new consumer each period and her buying decision is based on
the following discrete choice model. Let *! be the idiosyncratic preference
of the buyer for rm &’s product in the current period$ The utility that the
consumer gets from buying from rm & is
+! + ,-
!""! + .X
# 6=!
'!#'#!"#
#$$ )! + /*!$
"! + .
P
# 6=! '!#'#!"# is the e!ective installed base of rm & given the set of
compatible technologies where . # [0# 1] allows for the value of the installed
base of other compatible technologies to be worth less to consumers of rm
&’s product. +! is a measure of intrinsic product quality which is assumed to
be common across rms: + = +! and is also xed over time.4 Network e!ects
are captured by the increasing function ,-(·) where , " 0 is the parameter
that controls the strength of network e!ects. We will refer to the sum of these
two factors, +! + ,- (·), as quality. / 0 0 is proportional to the standard
deviation of *! and thus measures the degree of horizontal di!erentiation
between the products. The buyer can also choose to purchase an outside
good with utility +0 + *0$ As the instrinic quality parameters only a!ect
demand through the expression +0 $ +# wlog we set + = 0. The consumer’s
idiosyncratic preferences (*0# *1# $ $ $ # *" ) are unobservable to rms.
4A future extension is to allow rms to invest in quality in which case !! will be
endogenous.
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A new consumer buys from the rm o!ering the highest current utility.
To focus on the dynamics of rm behavior, we assume consumers make
myopic decisions. Assuming (*0# *1# $ $ $ # *" ) are independently extreme value
distributed, the probability that rm & makes a sale to a new consumer is
1! (); '# ") %
exp
µ
$%(&!+'
!
" 6=! (!"("!&")!)!
*
¶
exp
¡
+0
*
¢
+
P"
#=1 exp
µ
$%(&"+'
!
# 6=" ("#(#"&#)!)"
*
¶ #
where ) is the vector of prices of all rms, ' is the vector of compatibil-
ity choices, and " is the vector of installed bases. Note that if +0 = $&
then 10 (); '# ") = 1 $
P"
!=1 1! (); '# ") = 0, so the outside good is hope-
lessly unattractive and a consumer will buy from one of the ! rms with
probability one. In that case, expected market demand equals one in each
period and, most importantly, is independent of rms’ installed bases and
any decisions regarding compatibility and price. Those decisions will only
inuence a rm’s expected market share. The case of +0 = $& is referred to
as the case when market size (or demand) is xed. When instead +0 is not
innitely negative then the expected market size is endogenous. In particu-
lar, a rm can increase its expected demand without necessarily decreasing
the expected demand of its rivals by an equal amount.
2.3 Network E!ects and Transition Probabilities
In modelling network e!ects, we will assume they are bounded in the sense
that - ("!) = - (2) if "! " 2 for some 2 '%$ Bounding the network e!ect
is as specied in Cabral and Riordan (1994) though in their context was
learning-by-doing. Several functional forms will be considered in order to
derive robust results. These are provided below.
• Linear: - ("!) = &!, if "! ' 2.
• Convex: - ("!) = sin
³
-&!
2, +
3-
2
´
+ 1 if "! ' 2.
• Concave: - ("!) = sin
³
-&!
2,
´
if "! ' 2.
• S-shaped: - ("!) =
sin
"
$%!
&
+ 3$
2
#
+1
2 if "! ' 2.
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It is without loss of generality that the range of - (·) is [0# 1]. As qualita-
tive results were found to be similar across functional forms, we only report
results when - is linear.
!("!) denotes the probability that the installed base of rm & depreciates.
We specify !("!) = 1$ (1$ 3)&! , where 3 # [0# 1] is the rate of depreciation.
This specication captures the idea that the likelihood that a rm’s installed
base depreciates increases with the size of its installed base. 3 would be
expected to be higher where consumer turnover is higher or products are
short-lived so that consumers need to return to the market at a higher rate.
Letting 4! # {0# 1} indicate whether or not rm & makes the sale, its
installed base changes according to the transition function
Pr("0!|"!# 4!) =
½
1$!("!) if "0! = "! + 4!#
!("!) if "0! = "! + 4! $ 1#
where, at the upper and lower boundaries of the state space, we modify the
transition probabilities to be Pr(% |%# 1) = 1 and Pr(0|0# 0) = 1, respec-
tively.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Bellman Equation and Strategies
In working backwards through the compatibility and pricing decisions, we
use the following notation:
• 5!(") denotes the net present value of future cash ows to rm & in
state " before the compatibility decisions have been made.
• 6!('# ") denotes the net present value of future cash ows to rm & in
state " after the compatibility decisions have been made and revealed
to all rms.
We use '(") and )('# ") to denote the compatibility and pricing strategies
in equilibrium. Given compatibility choices ' and installed bases ", the net
present value of future cash ows to rm & is given by
6!('# ") = max
)!
1!()!# )!!('# "); '# ")()! $ 7)
+8
"X
#=0
1#()!# )!!('!# "); '# ")5 !#(")# (1)
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where )!!('# ") are the prices charged by rm &’s rivals in equilibrium (given
installed bases and compatibility choices), 7 " 0 is the marginal cost of
production, 8 # [0# 1) is the discount factor, and 5 !#(") is the continuation
value to rm & given that rm ( wins the current consumer.
Given any feasible vector of compatibility choices ', di!erentiating the
RHS of equation (1) with respect to )! and using the properties of logit
demand yields the rst-order condition
$ 1
/
1!(1$ 1!)()! $ 7+ 85 !!) + 1! + 8
X
# 6=!
1
/
1!1#5 !# = 0$ (2)
The pricing strategies )('# ") are the solution to the system of rst-order
conditions.
Folding back from pricing to compatibility decisions, given installed bases
"# the net present value of future cash ows to rm & is given by
5!(") = max
(!"{0.1}'"1
6!('!# '!!(")# ")# (3)
where '! = ('!1# $ $ $ # '!!!1# '!!+1# $ $ $ # '!") and '!!(") are the compatibility
choices of rm &’s rivals in equilibrium (given installed bases). Since rm
& has 2"!1 feasible compatibility choices the complexity of the problem is
increasing exponentially in the number of rms.
3.2 Computation
We focus attention on Markov perfect equilibria (MPE). Given that rms
are ex ante identical, we impose the restriction that the MPE is symmetric.
Moreover, we follow the majority of the literature on numerically solving
dynamic stochastic games (Pakes and McGuire, 1994, 2001) by restricting
attention to pure strategies.
As with many other dynamic models, the multiplicity of MPE is a con-
cern. Unfortunately, it is not practical to compute all of them using homo-
topy methods as in Besanko et al (2005) because our game is more complex
(compatibility and pricing decisions). In what follows we therefore pro-
pose an algorithm that computes a particular kind of equilibrium, namely
the limit of a nite-horizon game as the horizon grows to innity. This is
a widely used selection criterion in the theoretical literature on dynamic
games but, to the best of our knowledge, has never been applied to numer-
ically solving such games.
The idea is as follows: Given continuation values that encapsulate the
value of future play and installed bases, it is as if rms are playing a two-
stage game of making rst compatibility and then pricing decisions. In
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the last period of a nite-horizon game, the continuation values are zero.
Hence, we can solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage
game. In the previous-to-last period, the continuation values are given by
the equilibrium payo!s of the last period. Continuing this line of thought,
we can construct an algorithm that computes the limit of a nite-horizon
game by iterating backwards in time.
We set ! = 2 in what follows. This greatly simplies the computations
because there are only two possible outcomes of rms’ compatibility deci-
sions: either the products are compatible or they are not. Moreover, with
! = 2 it is clear that the products are compatible in equilibrium if and only
if both rms prefer it.
Our algorithm is iterative. It takes a value function e5!(") for each rm &
as the starting point for an iteration and generates an updated value function
5!(") along with policy functions )!('# ") and '!("). The initial value ise5!(") = 0, & = 1# 2 for all ", thereby ensuring that the continuation values
5 !#(") are zero.
Each iteration cycles through the state space in some predetermined
order. Given a state ", it solves for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
of the two-stage game in that state, holding xed the continuation values.
Specically, the algorithm process is as follows:
1. Solve the system of rst-order conditions (2) given rst '12(") =
'21(") = 0 and then '12(") = '21(") = 1. In doing so, use e5!(") to
compute 5 !#("), &# ( = 1# 2. This yields prices given compatibility de-
cisions, i.e., )!(0# 0# ") and )!(1# 1# "), & = 1# 2.
2. Substitute )!(0# 0# ") and )!(1# 1# "), & = 1# 2, into equation (1). This
yields payo!s given compatibility decisions, i.e., 6!(0# 0# ") and 6!(1# 1# "),
& = 1# 2.
3. Determine rms compatibility decisions as
'!#(") =
½
0 if 6!(0# 0# ") " 6!(1# 1# ")# & = 1# 2# ( 6= &
1 otherwise
4. Substitute '!#("), & = 1# 2, ( 6= &, into equation (3). This yields payo!s,
i.e., 5!(") and 5!("), & = 1# 2.
Once the computations for one state are completed, the algorithm moves
on to another state. After all states have been visited, the algorithm updates
the current guess for the value function by setting e5!(") = 5!("), & = 1# 2 for
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all ". This completes the iteration.5 The algorithm continues to iterate until
the relative change in the value and the policy functions from one iteration to
the next is below a pre-specied tolerance. This procedure always converged.
As already noted, multiplicity of MPE is a concern. One source of mul-
tiplicity is associated with the compatibility stage. Since products are com-
patible between rms & and ( if and only if both rms propose compatibility
then, for any state, there is always an equilibrium outcome in which a pair
of rms’ products are incompatible. Given, say, rm ( chooses not to pro-
pose compatibility, rm &’s payo! is the same regardless of whether or not it
proposes compatibility since products will be incompatible in either event.
When it is also an equilibrium for products to be compatible, that equilib-
rium will be selected because: 1) our interest is in exploring the implications
of product compatibility; and 2) the equilibrium with compatible products
Pareto dominates the one with incompatible products (except when com-
patibility does not matter, such as when . = 0). In the event that a rm is
indi!erent about whether or not to make its product compatible, we assume
it proposes incompatibility.6 At least when there are just two rms (which
is the market structure of focus in this paper), this selection criteria takes
care of multiplicity issues at the compatibility stage. This procedure always
converged and resulted in a unique equilibrium.
After solving for MPE value and policy functions, the analysis is two-
pronged. The rst exercise is to explore the policy function towards charac-
terizing the set of states such that rms have compatible technologies. Of
particular interest is to understand the degree of rm asymmetries - in terms
of installed bases - for which rms choose compatibility and how that de-
gree of asymmetry depends on the rate of consumer replacement, the extent
of spillovers from compatibility, and the strength of network e!ects. Thus,
we will be solving the model for the policy function for various parameter
congurations. The parameters are summarized in Table 1 along with the
di!erent values used in the numerical analysis. The key parameters are ,#
.# 3# and +0.7
The second set of exercises explores the determinants of market outcomes
and, in particular, the frequency with which market dominance emerges.
5Our procedure is a Gauss-Jacobi scheme; see Judd (1998) for an extensive discussion
of Gauss-Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel methods.
6Experimentation with the tie-breaking rule revealed that it does not make a di!erence
for our results.
7As an initial check that the parameter values are reasonable, we compared the demand
elasticities for our model with empirical estimates for products with network e!ects and
nd they are comparable in size. These results are available on request.
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Our approach is to use the equilibrium policy function to calculate the prob-
ability distribution over the industry’s state tomorrow given its state today;
that is, we use the policy function to construct the transition matrix of the
Markov process that characterizes industry dynamics in the equilibrium of
the game. This allows us to use tools from stochastic process theory to an-
alyze industry dynamics rather than rely on simulation. Both the short-run
(transient) dynamics and the long-run (limit or ergodic) distribution of the
Markov process are characterized.
4 Static Equilibrium
Prior to characterizing equilibria for the dynamic game, it is useful to rst
understand the incentives for compatibility in the static model. The static
equilibrium is derived by setting 8 = 0 in which case rms choose price to
maximize current prot. Installed bases matter only because of how they
a!ect the current value that consumers attach to rms’ products; they are
not an instrument to later dominance.
Representative of our ndings is Figure 1 where we have plotted rm 1’s
equilibrium price as a function of its own base, "1# and its rival’s base, "2.
Also reported is the compatibility region; that is, the states for which both
rms prefer compatibility and thus their products are compatible. When
compatibility a!ects market demand (. = $5 or . = 1), products are com-
patible when rms’ installed bases are su"ciently similar in size. The forces
at work are basically the same as those in other static models that allow
for compatibility choice and are most clearly identied in Cremer, Rey, and
Tirole (2000). We review and elaborate upon them below.
Holding price xed, there are two quantity e!ects from rms making
their products compatible. Compatibility raises rm &’s e!ective installed
base from "! to "!+."# which then increases the value that consumers attach
to its product by - ("! + ."#)$- ("!) $ Each rm’s product is more attractive
relative to the outside option. Firms then have a mutual interest in having
compatible products because both benet from drawing more consumers
into the market. This we refer to as the market expansion e!ect.
A second quantity e!ect arises when rms have di!erent installed bases.
In that situation, compatibility reduces the quality di!erential between their
products which, generally, harms the rm with a bigger installed base. In
other words, the larger rm has an edge because of its installed base and
that edge is partially (when . = $5) or fully (when . = 1) lost when prod-
ucts are made compatible. We call this the business gift e!ect as it means
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enhancing the business stealing e!ect of one’s rival. As shown in the appen-
dix, su"cient conditions for the business gift e!ect to harm the rm with
the larger installed base are that - is linear or concave and/or . ' 1$ If -
is su"ciently convex and . ¿ 1, it is possible that the business gift e!ect
instead harms the rm with the smaller installed base. Since our reported
results are for when - is linear, the business gift e!ect then harms the larger
rm and benets the smaller rm.
Supplementing these quantity e!ects are price e!ects which can best be
understood through the following decomposition when . = 1$ Suppose the
initial state is ("1# "2) = ("0# "00) where "0 9 "00$ Compatibility can then be
decomposed into two parts: it causes rms’ e!ective installed bases to shift
from ("0# "00) to ("00# "00) and then from ("00# "00) to ("0 + "00# "0 + "00) $ As the rst
shift only improves the smaller rm’s quality, its price rises and the larger
rm’s price falls.8 The second shift causes both rms’ prices to increase as
the quality of their products rises relative to the outside good.9 The rst
price e!ect is ambiguous as to how it impacts protability though the second
price e!ect amplies the market expansion e!ect and thus further enhances
the value to making products compatible.
We can now use the market expansion and business gift e!ects to explain
why compatibility emerges when rms’ installed bases are su"ciently similar
in size. Suppose rms have identical installed bases and recall that rms are
static prot-maximizers in this exercise. Both rms experience higher prot
by having compatible products because they take demand away from the
outside good (which is the market expansion e!ect) and neither rm loses
any advantage over its competitor since relative quality is una!ected (that
is, there is no business gift e!ect). Now suppose rms’ bases are close but
not identical. With compatibility, the larger rm loses only a small relative
quality advantage over the smaller rm (since similar bases means similar
qualities) but there is a discrete jump in quality with compatibility. Hence,
the market expansion e!ect exceeds the business gift e!ect when a rm’s
installed base is slightly larger than that of its rival. Obviously, the rm
with a smaller base is better o! with compatible products. This explains
why there is an area around the diagonal in which rms agree to make
their products compatible, as can be seen in Figure 1. Now move the bases
8For our demand structure, Anderson et al (1992, p. 266) prove that a rm’s equi-
librium price is increasing in its quality (or installed base). Since prices are strategic
complements then a rm’s equilibrium price is decreasing in the other rm’s quality.
9 If rms have a common quality (which is comprised of both intrinsic quality and
network e!ects) then the symmetric equilibrium price can be shown to be increasing in
that common quality as long as exp !0 " 0 (that is, market size is variable).
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farther o! of the diagonal. The business gift e!ect rises in importance - as
the larger rm gives up a greater quality advantage - until it exceeds the
market expansion e!ect; at that point the larger rm prefers that products
be incompatible.10
This explanation is conrmed when one examines the case when there is
no outside good (+0 = $&). Since the market expansion e!ect vanishes, only
the business gift e!ect is operative which would argue that the larger rm
would never want to have compatible products. Indeed, when the market
size is xed, compatibility never occurs in equilibrium as long as rms have
di!erent installed bases.
5 Dynamic Equilibrium
5.1 With Outside Good
We begin by assuming +0 = 0 so that market demand is not xed. Depend-
ing on the parameter values, four qualitatively distinct equilibrium policy
functions were found.11 These are referred to as Flat, Rising, Trenchy, and
Dual Trenchy. Based upon visual inspection, Table 2 reports the type of
equilibrium for an array of values for 3 , , , and ..
A Flat equilibrium is a modest perturbation of the policy function for
a static equilibrium. Not surprisingly, it arises when dynamic e!ects are
minimal - either the network e!ect is weak (, is low), spillovers are absent
(. = 0), and/or customer turnover is high (3 is high). Note that when 3 is
high, there is little point in competing aggressively for customers in order
to build an installed base since a rm’s gains are likely to fritter away due
to customer turnover; in other words, the return to investment is low when
the depreciation rate is high.
A Rising equilibrium is characterized by a fairly monotonic policy func-
tion for which price is increasing in a rm’s own base but relatively insen-
sitive to its rival’s base; an example is shown in Figure 2. Products are
typically incompatible. This equilibrium arises when compatibility does not
impact demand (. = 0) or when the rate of customer turnover rate is very
low. Also reported in Figure 2 are the limit (or ergodic) distribution and the
transient distributions - for 5, 15, and 25 periods - starting from an initial
state in which ("1# "2) = (0# 0). Though the limit distribution is unimodal
10We have indeed conrmed that where incompatibility occurs, the smaller rm prefers
to have compatible products but it is vetoed by the larger rm.
11Recall that we always found the equilibrium to be unique so, for any parameter con-
guration, only one of these equilibrium types is observed.
14
and rather tight, this is misleading as, with such a low rate of customer
turnover, each rm will frequently achieve the maximal installed base of 20
in the long run. Over shorter horizons, the distribution is rather dispersed
and it is quite common for the market outcome to be skewed. This is seen
in the transient distributions.
For the primary dynamic forces of our model to be at work, the relevant
part of the parameter space is when compatibility matters, network e!ects
are not weak, and the rate of customer turnover is not too high. In that
part of the parameter space, two types of equilibria are dominant: Trenchy
and Dual Trenchy. These are by far the most insightful for learning about
dynamic competition and will be the focus of our attention for the remainder
of the analysis.
5.1.1 Trenchy Equilibrium
A Trenchy equilibrium has the following properties: i) intense price com-
petition when rms’ installed bases are of comparable size; ii) the limit
distribution for installed bases is bimodal with a lot of mass at highly asym-
metric states; and iii) products are generally incompatible. An example of a
Trenchy equilibrium is shown in Figure 3. The policy function for a Trenchy
equilibrium is characterized by a deep trench along and around the diago-
nal. In Figure 3, price is actually negative - below marginal cost - for some
states near the diagonal. Su"ciently o! of the diagonal, price is relatively
high. This equilibrium is similar to that found in models with increasing
returns such as arises with advertising (Doraszelski and Markovich, 2005)
and learning-by-doing (Besanko et al, 2005).12
When rms have su"ciently disparate installed bases, dynamic competi-
tion largely ceases as reected in relatively high prices (these are the plateaus
o! of the diagonal). Due to network e!ects, the protable strategy for the
smaller rm is to accept having a low market share. If instead it were to try
to supplant the larger rm, it would need to price at a considerable discount
in light of the quality disadvantage emanating from a smaller installed base
and that products are incompatible. Furthermore, low pricing would have
to continue for an extended period of time in order to eliminate the installed
base di!erential. Since such an aggressive strategy is not protable and thus
not pursued, prices are high and the larger rm reaps large prots due to its
high market share by virtue of having a better product (which comes from
a bigger installed base and network e!ects).
12This is also the case with capacity investment with price competition (Besanko and
Doraszelski, 2004; Chen, 2005) though it is not an increasing returns story.
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It is this “prize” to a rm with a signicant installed base advantage that
causes competition to be so intense when rms have comparable installed
bases. A rm knows that if it were to gain such an advantage that the other
(smaller) rm would accept its position in the market and the larger rm
would reap high prots. We then have a deep trench along and around the
diagonal where prices are very low. Each rm’s conduct focuses on ghting
its rival to become the dominant rm. Note that for states in the trench,
rms’ products are incompatible except possibly when "1 = "2.13
As shown in Figure 3, the limit distribution on installed bases is bimodal,
which indicates that it is quite likely market dominance will emerge. Once
one of the rms gains an advantage in terms of installed bases, the strength
of network e!ects transforms it into a long-run advantage. The movement
towards skewed outcomes is apparent by following the transient distribution
over time; more and more mass is dispersed away from the diagonal. The
pricing behavior of rms contributes to the emergence and persistence of
market dominance since the rm with the smaller installed base generally
accepts its position by not pricing aggressively. The Trenchy equilibrium
embodies the quintessential property of network e!ects which is that the
market “tips” to one rm dominating as soon as it has an advantage.
As reported in Table 2, a Trenchy equilibrium occurs when the network
e!ect is strong - it does not occur for , # {1# 2} but does arise when , # {3# 4}
- and customer turnover is modest (3 is low). For a rm to price aggressively
and forego current prot, the prospect of future dominance by building its
installed base must be su"ciently great. This requires that the network
e!ect is su"ciently strong and the installed base does not deteriorate too
rapidly.
Result 1 ("Fight-Your-Rival" Equilibrium) When the network e!ect
is strong and customer turnover is modest, equilibrium is characterized by
incompatible products, intense price competition when rms’ installed bases
are of comparable size, and tipping towards market dominance when one
rm gains an advantage in terms of its installed base.
5.1.2 Dual Trenchy Equilibrium
The Dual Trenchy equilibrium is new to the increasing returns literature
and arises solely because of the option of compatibility. A Dual Trenchy
13Note that products are not always compatible on the diagonal. Incompatibility occurs
when rms price below marginal cost because of their eagerness to increase their installed
bases. As a result, compatibility would reduce current prot because it increases demand
and each unit sold is at a loss.
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equilibrium has the following properties: i) high prices when rms’ installed
bases are of similar or highly disparate size but intense price competition
when modestly di!erent; ii) the transient and limit distributions for installed
bases are unimodal with a lot of mass at reasonably symmetric states; and
iii) products are compatible when rms’ installed bases are comparable.
Examples are provided in Figure 4 - when (3# ,# .) = ($01# 3# 1) - and Figure
5 - when (3# ,# .) = ($08# 3# 1).
Let us explore compatibility and pricing in three scenarios: when the
installed base di!erential is large, modest, and small.
Large installed base di!erential. When the di!erential is large, the
outcome is basically the same as with a Trenchy equilibrium. Products
are incompatible and the rm with the larger installed base dominates the
market due to network e!ects. The smaller rm is resigned to its inferior
position in the market and thus dynamic competition is minimal. Prices are
relatively high as a result.
Small installed base di!erential. When rms have installed bases that
are identical or highly comparable in size, prices are also relatively high
though now products are compatible. Recall from our examination of the
static equilibrium that compatibility reduces the quality di!erential emanat-
ing from rms having di!erent installed bases, which is detrimental to the
rm with a bigger installed base. At the same time, it enhances both rms’
product quality and thereby expands the market. The former e!ect we re-
ferred to as the business gift e!ect and the latter as the market expansion
e!ect. Due to these two e!ects, there was a region around the diagonal for
which both rms choose to make their products compatible. These forces are
still present in the dynamic equilibrium and are partly at work in generating
the compatibility region for a Dual Trenchy equilibrium.
Though products are compatible, this need not imply the absence of
price competition. For a Trenchy equilibrium, rms often make their prod-
ucts compatible when they have identical installed bases and, at the same
time, price very low in order to acquire an advantage in its installed base.
Such dynamic price competition is not observed for a Dual Trenchy equilib-
rium when the installed base di!erential is small. To see why, suppose . = 1
and rms begin with identical installed bases. Regardless of which rm (if
any) wins today’s customer and thereby expands its installed base, rms
expect their products to be compatible tomorrow. This follows from the
compatibility region encompassing asymmetric as well as symmetric states.
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Thus, a rm who gains a small installed base advantage does not antici-
pate gaining a quality advantage in the near term because compatibility is
maintained. Quite contrary to acquiring sales to dominate, there could be
a short-run free-rider e!ect because a rm that lowers price and increases
the probability of a sale benets the future quality of both rms’ products
compared to the outside option. When the compatibility region is extensive,
rms anticipate compatible products in the near future when the installed
base di!erential is relatively low; this sties dynamic price competition.
Modest installed base di!erential. The most intriguing region is when
rms have modestly di!erent installed bases in which case prices are low as
reected in the dual trenches in the policy function. As explained below,
pricing behavior is largely driven by dynamics associated with endogenous
product compatibility. Whether or not products are compatible tomorrow
depends on rms’ installed bases tomorrow; only if they are su"ciently
similar in size will rms mutually decide to have compatible products. Of
course, tomorrow’s state depends on today’s pricing. With a Dual Trenchy
equilibrium, pricing is then driven not only by the prospect of dominating
the market - a force that is ever present in a market with network e!ects -
but also by the strength of rms’ desire to maintain product compatibility.
To explore the incentives for compatibility, rst note that the smaller
rm almost always prefers compatible products - as it is benetted both by
the market expansion and business gift e!ects - while the larger rm prefers
compatible products only when the installed base di!erential is su"ciently
small. Thus, when products are incompatible, it is the larger rm that
prevents it.14 Let us begin by examining how the smaller rm’s desire for
compatibility inuences its pricing behavior.
Corresponding to Figures 4 and 5, Figures 6 and 7 report rm 1’s price
for di!erent states. The states for which rms’ products are compatible are
shaded, while negative (below cost) prices are boxed. Prices are high when
rms have comparable bases (that is, near the diagonal). As the state moves
farther o! of the diagonal - so that the di!erence in rms’ bases increases -
the smaller rm lowers its price. It does so even though rms’ products are
of equal quality (due to compatibility and . = 1). In particular, the smaller
rm signicantly drops its price when the state approaches the (interior)
14This was veried numerically. For the 62,160 di!erent combinations of parameters
and asymmetric states, the smaller rm prefers compatible products in 57,715 of them
and prefers incompatible products in only ve instances (with the remainder there is
indi!erence). For the larger rm, there are 11,172 instances in which it prefers compatible
products and 46,548 instances in which it prefers incompatible products.
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border of the compatibility region. Its intent is to increase expected sales
and thereby reduce the installed base di!erential. In Figure 6, rm 1’s price
drops from 0.8 to 0.2 when the state moves from ("1# "2) = (4# 6) to (4# 7)
where (4# 7) is just on the interior of the compatibility region. Just outside
of the compatibility region, the smaller rm drops price even more; when
the state moves from (4# 7) to (4# 8)# rm 1’s price drops from 0.2 to -0.7. In
Figure 7, rm 1’s price drops from 1.3 to 1.0 as it goes from (4# 9) to (4# 10)
(just on the interior of the compatibility region) but from 1.0 to -0.1 as it
goes from (4# 10) to (4# 11) (just on the exterior of the compatibility region).
The smaller rm is trying to add to its base in order to move the state
back into the region where the larger rm prefers compatibility. Compared
to when the state is just inside the compatibility region, this task is made
more di"cult because products are no longer compatible which means the
smaller rm su!ers from a quality disadvantage. To compensate for that
disadvantage, it needs to sell its product at an even bigger discount to the
larger rm’s product.
In sum, the smaller rm is pricing aggressively in order to keep the di!er-
ential in installed bases su"ciently small. Its intent is to pacify, rather than
ght, the larger rm so that the larger rm will "make nice" (by having a
compatible product) rather than "make mean" (by pursuing monopolization
through incompatible products).
Though the larger rm also drops price around the border of the com-
patibility region, that apparently is a response to the smaller rm’s pricing
behavior - as their prices are strategic complements - rather than an at-
tempt to monopolize. For example, in Figure 6, a movement in the state
from (4# 6) to (4# 7) results in the smaller rm dropping price from 0.8 to
0.2, while the larger rm’s price only falls from 1.5 to 1.2. Examination of
the value function shows that, along the border of the compatibility region,
the large rm only slightly prefers compatibility which is why it is willing
to price much higher than the smaller rm even though it might mean the
state moves out of the compatibility region. In contrast, the smaller rm
strongly prefers compatibility, which explains why it is willing to price so
low in order for the state to remain in that region.
It is worth emphasizing that this pricing behavior is quite distinct from
what static demand e!ects would produce. Within the compatibility region,
the relative quality of rms’ products is identical since products are com-
patible and . = 1$ In a static model, prices would then be identical while
we nd they are di!erent (in particular, the smaller rm has a lower price).
Second, price falls sharply just outside of the compatibility region but even-
tually rises as the installed base di!erential becomes su"ciently large. That
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is also in support of our dynamic story as a rm’s static equilibrium price
monotonically declines as its relative quality falls.
A Dual Trenchy equilibrium occurs when network e!ects are neither
weak nor strong and the e!ect of compatibility on demand is signicant. It
is typical when , # {1# 2} but also occurs when , # {3# 4} as long as 3 is not
too low. If the network e!ect is weak then pricing is largely uninuenced
by dynamic considerations, while if it is strong then the ability to translate
a small installed base advantage into long-run dominance deters the larger
rm from making its product compatible. Obviously, the impact of compat-
ibility on demand has to be su"ciently strong for the larger rm to prefer
compatibility over a dominance strategy.
Result 2 ("Pacify-Your-Rival" Equilibrium) When the network e!ect
is modestly strong and the e!ect of compatibility on demand is strong then
equilibrium is characterized by compatible products, mild price competition,
and an absence of market dominance.
5.2 Without Outside Good
When +0 = $&, each consumer buys from either rm 1 or rm 2 as the
outside option is wholly unattractive. Firms are then competing over a mar-
ket of xed size which means there is no market expansion e!ect. Higher
quality for a rm’s product may attract consumers who would have oth-
erwise bought from one’s rival but will not increase the total number of
consumers who are purchasing. This is an environment expected to breed
intense competition.
In eliminating the market expansion e!ect, the rst notable consequence
is that rms now never choose to make their products compatible, except
possibly when their installed bases are identical. This is a property that is
quite predictable in light of the preceding discussion. With a xed market
size, each rm is only interested in having higher quality relative to its rival.
Compatibility is then always to the detriment of the larger rm as it shifts
demand to its rival.
Though a Dual Trenchy equilibrium does not then arise when +0 = $&,
the other types of equilibria are still present. A Trenchy equilibrium occurs
for a wider array of parameter values relative to when market demand is
elastic. When +0 = 0# rms do not compete aggressively for dominance when
, # {1# 2} (that is, there are no Trenchy equilibria). However, a Trenchy
equilibrium does occur when +0 = $&; it arises for 3 # {$04# $ $ $ # $07} when
, = 1 and 3 # {$04# $ $ $ # $12} when , = 2$ Fixing the market size then
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intensies competition, as rms compete to gain an advantage in terms of
their installed base, and provides almost no basis for compatibility.
6 Product Compatibility and Market Dominance
One of the central questions of this research project is understanding to
what extent endogenous product compatibility can prevent market domi-
nance from emerging. If the transient and limit distributions with respect
to installed bases are heavily skewed - putting a lot of mass on relatively
asymmetric outcomes - then market dominance is likely to occur. The ex-
tent to which compatibility is feasible can be measured by the parameter ..
Firms e!ectively do not have the option of compatible products when . = 0
as compatibility does not impact demand. As products are almost never
compatible when the market size is xed, the results reported here are for
when +0 = 0$ Furthermore, variable market demand would seem to be the
more empirically relevant scenario.
The pricing behavior identied in the previous section creates a "com-
patibility dynamic" which has the potential for maintaining some balance
in the market and avoiding dominance. Suppose rms begin with iden-
tical or near-identical installed bases. They generally will nd it optimal
to make their products compatible in order to expand the market. With
products of similar quality, rms charge similar prices. At that point, their
expected market shares are comparable. Though, in expectation, future in-
stalled bases remain similar in size, random shocks to demand and customer
turnover could result in one of the rms gaining a signicant advantage in
terms of installed bases. If that di!erential becomes large enough, products
will no longer be compatible and rms will price in a manner to perpetuate
such a skewed market structure. However, in a Dual Trenchy equilibrium,
there are forces preventing a slight advantage from growing into a large one.
When rms’ installed bases di!er and are near the boundary of the com-
patibility region, the smaller rm prices aggressively in order to increase its
installed base and thereby shift the state back towards symmetry. When
the state is close to but outside of the compatibility region - so that the
larger rm chooses to make its product incompatible - the smaller rm of-
fers its product at an even larger discount so as to shift the state back into
the compatibility region and eliminate the quality di!erential. The strategic
pricing behavior of the smaller rm in the vicinity of the boundary of the
compatibility region acts to keep the state within that region and thus works
against market dominance.
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The compatibility dynamic is revealed by reporting the resultant force,
which measures the direction of movement of the state. Its expected move-
ment is determined by computing the probability-weighted average of the
di!erence between next and this period’s state. Figure 8 shows the resul-
tant forces for the three parameter congurations in Figures 3-5. Figure 8a
has a Trenchy equilibrium and, therefore, products are incompatible (except
perhaps on the diagonal). Once the state is o! of the diagonal, so that rms
have di!erent installed bases, the state moves away from symmetry as the
larger rm builds on its advantage. Increasing returns is at work. Figures 8b
and 8c have a Dual Trenchy equilibrium and nicely show how the increasing
returns dynamic can be countered by the compatibility dynamic. In Figure
8b, the state is moving up and towards the diagonal as long as the installed
base di!erential is not too large. If it does become great then increasing
returns kick in and the larger rm grows yet larger. In Figure 8c, where
the rate of customer turnover is higher, there is a strong attraction to the
diagonal for a wide range of states. In both of these cases, we are observing
forces that move the state backs towards symmetry once it has moved away.
The real test of this dynamic is examining how the option of compati-
bility impacts the distribution on installed bases. Let us begin with a few
illustrative examples and then present more systematic evidence. For two
di!erent parameter congurations, Figure 9 reports the limit distributions
when . = 0 and . = 1 and, for the latter, the set of states for which products
are compatible. In Figure 9a, the network e!ect is moderate (, = 2) and
thus the limit distribution is unimodal even when compatibility is not an
option. Market dominance is not likely to emerge in that case. As compat-
ibility becomes a possibility (. = 1), a unimodal distribution persists with
more mass pushed towards symmetric outcomes. Introducing the option of
compatibility makes it more likely that a roughly symmetric state occurs
though does not have a sizable impact.
As the strength of networks e!ects is increased to , = 3# endogenous
product compatibility makes a striking di!erence; see Figure 9b. When
. = 0, the limit distribution is signicantly bimodal. Without the prospect
of compatibility, it is very likely that one of the rms will dominate the
market. Allowing for products to be compatible has a dramatic e!ect as
the distribution shifts to being unimodal with a lot of mass around the
diagonal. Firms are choosing to make their products compatible unless the
state is reasonably asymmetric.15 Introducing the option of compatibility
15For the case of a very strong network e!ect (# = 4), which is not shown, endogenous
compatibility does not matter as, even when $ = 1% products are incompatible and a
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makes it vastly less likely that market dominance will emerge.
Table 3 and Figure 10 provide a broader set of conrming results. Focus-
ing on 3 ' $15# Table 3 reports the mode of the limit distribution.16 High-
lighted are parameter values for which a bimodal distribution occurs when
compatibility is not an option (. = 0) and a unimodal distribution occurs
when compatibility is an option (. = 1)$ For example, when (3# ,) = ($07# 3),
the lack of compatibility results in a highly skewed mode in which one rm
has an installed base of 15 units and the other has only one unit. When
rms have the option of product compatibility, the mode is symmetric with
each having eight units. Figure 10 reports the expected long-run Hernd-
ahl index using the limit distribution over states. To the extent that the
long-run Herndahl index exceeds 0$5, asymmetries arise and persist. If the
customer turnover rate is not too low, the option of compatibility reduces
market concentration and sometimes signicantly so.
To summarize, endogenous product compatibility can neutralize the usual
increasing returns mechanism associated with network e!ects. The trick is
keeping the di!erential in installed bases su"ciently modest so that the
larger rm chooses to make its product compatible. The burden of ensur-
ing the di!erential is kept low falls on the smaller rm, whose incentive for
compatibility is much greater, and is reected in aggressive pricing when
the installed base di!erential becomes too large. Whenever the state ends
up close to the boundary of the compatibility region, the smaller rm sig-
nicantly lowers its price to increase its installed base. If it should fail and
the larger rm becomes yet larger, then the asymmetric market structure
persists as both rms price relatively high. Nevertheless, such an occurrence
tends to be rather unlikely because of the strategic pricing of the smaller
rm and in this manner market dominance is avoided in spite of the presence
of network e!ects. Compatible products can be stable and, as a result, both
rms can have signicant market shares in the long-run.
Result 3 (Avoidance of Market Dominance) Having the option of prod-
uct compatibility can result in a market achieving a relatively symmetric
outcome when, in the absence of that option, there would have been market
dominance.
bimodal distribution arises. Though this has not been established, it is possible that a
bimodal distribution always arises by making the network e!ect su"ciently large.
16A bimodal distribution never occurs for & " '15'
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7 Strength of Network E!ects
Figure 11 reports the long-run Herndahl index and shows, consistent with
previous work, that market concentration is increasing in the strength of
the network e!ect. This is true whether or not rms have the option of
compatibility though that option does tend to reduce concentration. Where
there is a big increase in concentration from a stronger network e!ect -
such as when , rises from 2 to 3 for (3# .) = ($08# 0) and from 3 to 4 for
(3# .) = ($08# 1) - it is because the equilibrium is switching to a Trenchy
equilibrium. Indeed, inspection of Table 2 shows that a Trenchy equilibrium
is more likely when , is higher.
While these general results are useful, more insight may be had by ex-
ploring how the equilibrium policy function changes with respect to the
strength of network e!ects. Consider Figure 12. When network e!ects are
weak (, = 1)# there is a mild Dual Trenchy (almost Flat) equilibrium with
a large compatibility region. The limit distribution is unimodal. As , is
increased, the dual trenches deepen and the compatibility region shrinks.
The larger rm increasingly prefers a monopolization strategy rather than
enhancing current demand through compatibility. This causes the compat-
ibility region to shrink. Because a dominance strategy is more appealing to
the larger rm, it is all the more important for the smaller rm to prevent
the gap in bases from widening too much. This induces it to price lower
along the border of the compatibility region; hence, the trench deepens as ,
rises. While the limit distribution does become more dispersed as the net-
work e!ect rises - indicating that it is more likely that installed bases will
be highly asymmetric - the e!ect is weak. The real impact of a stronger
network e!ect is to induce the smaller rm to price more aggressively in
order to ensure that products are compatible. This highlights the role of the
compatibility dynamic in that market dominance is only mildly increasing
when the network e!ect is strengthened.
Figure 13 considers the same parameter conguration as in Figure 12
except that . = $5 so that compatibility does not have as much an impact
on product quality. Again, the equilibrium is a mild Dual Trenchy when
, = 1$ As , rises, the plateau between the dual trenches shrinks as the
compatibility region declines in size. In fact, when , goes from 3 to 4, the
plateau disappears and the dual trenches are replaced with a single trench
around the diagonal. In other words, the equilibrium has morphed from
Dual Trenchy to Trenchy. Except for when rms’ bases are low and similar,
products are no longer compatible when , = 4. In this case, the limit distri-
bution does go through a drastic change as it moves from being unimodal
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to bimodal. Having su"ciently increased the strength of the network e!ect,
market dominance now emerges with great frequency.
In exploring the relationship between the network e!ect and product
compatibility, we observe in Figures 12 and 13 that the compatibility region
shrinks as , rises. This is conrmed to hold more generally. There are two
ways in which an enhanced network e!ect reduces the incentive of the larger
rm to make its product compatible. First, a higher value for , makes
it more likely that a current advantage - in terms of the installed base -
will result in future market dominance. A rm with a bigger base is then
more inclined to want to build on its competitive advantage, which it can
do by making its product incompatible. Second, a rise in , improves the
quality of rms’ products which makes them more attractive compared to
the outside good. This serves to weaken the size of the market expansion
e!ect coming from making products compatible. Both these e!ects work
towards reducing the incentive for compatibility and making it more likely
that rms will compete aggressively.
In spite of the compatibility region shrinking as the network e!ect strength-
ens, it is not always the case that products are less likely to be compatible.
Figure 14 reports the long-run probability that products are compatible
using the probability distribution over states given by the limit distribu-
tion. When the customer turnover rate is relatively low, the frequency with
which products are compatible is generally lower when the network e!ect is
stronger. In some cases, the frequency drops to zero which reects a shift of
the equilibrium from Dual Trenchy to Trenchy.
However, when the customer turnover rate is modestly high (3 " $1),
products aremore likely to be compatible when the network e!ect is stronger.
Consider the case of 3 = $14 where the probability of compatible products
rises from .68 to .83 as , increases from 1 to 4. This is in spite of the fact
that, as shown in Figure 12, the set of states for which products are com-
patible is shrinking. The resolution of this riddle lies in the policy functions.
Because the network e!ect is stronger, the smaller rm is more aggressive
in keeping the installed base di!erential relatively low as it fears the larger
rm may shift to a monopolization strategy. This is reected in the deeper
trench in the policy function when comparing , = 1 and , = 4$ It is this
aggressive pricing behavior that makes it more likely that the state remains
in the compatibility region when , = 4 than when , = 1 even though the
region is smaller.
Note that this surprising comparative static occurs as long as the equi-
librium is Dual Trenchy. But for a Dual Trenchy equilibrium to persist as ,
is increased (and not transform into a Trenchy equilibrium), it is necessary
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that the customer turnover rate not be too low. That is why 3 must be
su"ciently high for a stronger network e!ect to increase the frequency of
compatible products.
Result 4 (Strength of Network E!ect) A stronger network e!ect in-
creases market concentration. A stronger network e!ect decreases the fre-
quency of compatible products when the customer turnover rate is low and
increases the frequency of compatible products when the customer turnover
rate is high.
8 Concluding Remarks
The main contribution of this paper is identifying the compatibility dynamic
which can prevent market dominance in markets with network e!ects. When
rms have comparably-sized installed bases, they choose to make their prod-
ucts compatible in order to expand market size. This occurs at a cost to
the rm with the larger installed base since its quality advantage over the
other rm is diminished when products are compatible. However, as long
as installed bases are su"ciently similar in size, the reduction in relative
quality is small relative to the rise in absolute quality so the larger rm
prefers to have compatible products (and the smaller rm always prefers
it). The challenge to compatibility being stable is that, due to the random-
ness in demand and customer turnover, the di!erential in rms’ installed
bases could grow to the point that the larger rm chooses to pursue a dom-
inance strategy and thus makes its product incompatible. However, there
are strong forces preventing a slight advantage from growing into a consid-
erable one. When rms’ installed bases di!er and are near the boundary
of the compatibility region, the smaller rm prices aggressively in order to
increase its installed base and thereby shift the state backs towards symme-
try. When the state is close to but outside of the compatibility region - so
that the larger rm chooses to make its product incompatible - the smaller
rm o!ers its product at an even larger discount so as to shift the state back
into the compatibility region and eliminate the quality di!erential. Strate-
gic pricing tends to keep the installed base di!erential from expanding to
the point that incompatibility occurs. Compatible products are then sta-
ble. The compatibility dynamic is able to neutralize increasing returns and
result in long-run market structures that are not characterized by a single
dominant rm.
This research project will continue in two directions. First is to extend
the model to allow for three rms. In most models, the extension from
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duopoly to triopoly is straightforward and uninteresting. To the contrary,
the triopoly extension for our model poses modelling challenges and is likely
to produce additional insight. As regards modelling challenges, there are
likely to be multiple equilibria as di!erent collections of rms could choose
to have compatible products. In the duopoly model, such existed in that
there is always an equilibrium without compatible products. However, if
there is an equilibrium with compatible products, it was selected because
of both weak dominance and the Pareto criterion. When there are three
rms, it is no longer clear that these selection criteria will give us a unique
solution. For example, suppose when rms have identical installed bases,
there is an equilibrium in which only two rms’ products are compatible and
no equilibrium in which all three are compatible. There are, of course, three
such equilibria in the triopoly case and they are not Pareto-ranked. This is
a modelling challenge for the triopoly case.
More substantively is to explore whether compatibility and the avoidance
of market dominance is easier with three rms. Recall for the duopoly case
that products are almost never compatible when the market size is xed. Is it
possible that the presence of a third rm could induce compatibility in such
an environment? Note that from the perspective of two rms, the remaining
third rm is an outside option though one whose value is endogenous. As
products were compatible when an outside option was present, this suggests
that some compatibility may emerge in a broader set of circumstances where
there are three rms.
The second research direction is to enrich the model by allowing rms to
innovate. Prior to deciding on compatibility and price, each rm invests in
R&D; the outcome of which is stochastic and a!ects the intrinsic quality of
the good. Does the option of product compatibility reduce innovation as a
rm can free ride as long as products are compatible? Is market dominance
more likely when rms can innovate? Does innovation o!set the compat-
ibility dynamic and allow increasing returns to ourish? Can a policy of
mandatory compatibility be socially desirable? These are some of questions
that will be addressed.
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9 Appendix: Analysis of Market Expansion and
Business Gift E!ects
To parse out the market expansion and business gift e!ects, consider the
e!ect on rm 1’s demand from having compatible products:
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!0 ("1# "2# .) and !!1 ("1# "2) measure the market size, for the case of
compatible and incompatible products respectively, in terms of total demand
for these two rms as a proportion of total demand including the outside
option. The market expansion e!ect from making products compatible is
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then necessarily positive when:
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This is true as long as . 0 0 and -0 0 0$
The business gift e!ect concerns the impact of compatibility on each
rm’s share of market demand (excluding the outside option). It is measured
by:
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The business gift e!ect is said to apply to the rm with the larger in-
stalled base when its market share declines with compatibility. That is, if
"1 0 "2 then "0 ("1# "2# .)$"!1 ("1# "2) 9 0. Using (4), a su"cient condition
is:
If "1 0 "2 then "2-0 ("1 + ."2) 9 "1-0 ("2 + ."1) (. # (0# 1) $ (5)
A su"cient condition for (5) is:
-0 ("2 + ."1) " -0 ("1 + ."2) (. # (0# 1) $ (6)
Since "1 0 "2 implies "1 + ."2 " "2 + ."1# (6) holds when - is linear or
concave. Thus, if there is a constant or diminishing marginal e!ect of the
installed base on a product’s value then the business gift e!ect harms the
rm with the larger installed base and benets the rm with the smaller
installed base.
The business e!ect also applies to the larger rm when spillovers are
complete (that is, . = 1):
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In sum, product compatibility reduces the market share of the rm with
the larger installed base when either - is linear or concave and/or . is
su"ciently close to one. For the business gift e!ect to instead imply that the
smaller rm’s market share is reduced with compatible products, necessary
conditions are that .¿ 1 and - is su"ciently convex.
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Figure 1. Policy function and compatibility region (static equilibrium). v0 = 0, σ = 1, θ = 3.
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Figure 6. Price function p1(b1,b2). v0 = 0, σ = 1, δ = 0.01, θ = 3, λ = 1.
Compatibility is indicated by shaded background, negative prices are boxed.
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Figure 7. Price function p1(b1,b2). v0 = 0, σ = 1, δ = 0.08, θ = 3, λ = 1.
Compatibility is indicated by shaded background, negative prices are boxed.
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(c) δ = 0.08, θ = 3, λ = 1
Figure 8. Resultant forces. v0 = 0, σ = 1.
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Figure 10. Long−run Herfindahl Index (H∞). Solid lines: λ = 0, dashed lines: λ = 1.
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Figure 11. Long−run Herfindahl Index (H∞). Solid lines: λ = 0, dashed lines: λ = 1.
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Figure 14. Probability of compatibility. λ = 1.
Table 1
Parameter Range Description
, 0# 1# 2# 3# 4 Network e!ect
% 20 Maximum base
2 15 Base where network e!ect maxes out
. 0# $5# 1 Degree of compatibility or spillover
3 0# $01# $ $ $ # $20# $25# $ $ $ # 1 Customer turnover or depreciation
/ $5# 1 Horizontal di!erentiation
= 1 Price sensitivity
+0 $&#$3#$1# 0 Value of outside option
+ 0 Intrinsic product quality
7 0 Marginal cost
8 1>1$05 Discount factor
! 2 Number of rms
.
28
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2
1 F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F
2 R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
3 R R R RT RT T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T
4 R R R RT RT T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2
1 M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
2 D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D
3 D D R RT RT T T T T T TD TD D D D D D D D D D
4 R R R RT RT T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2
1 M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
2 D D D D D M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
3 D D D RT RT T T D D D D D D D D D D D D D D
4 R R R RT RT T T T T T D D D D D D D D D D D
F: Flat RT: Morphing from Rising to Trenchy
R: Rising TD: Morphing from Trenchy to Dual Trenchy
T: Trenchy M: Mild Dual Trenchy
D: Dual Trenchy
!
Table 2. Type of Equilibrium, v0 = 0, ! = 1
"# = 0
!
# = 0.5 "
!
# = 1 "
# = 0 # = 1 # = 0 # = 1 # = 0 # = 1
0 (20,20) (20,20) (20,20) (20,20) (20,20) (20,20)
0.01 (20,20) (20,20) (20,20) (20,20) (20,20) (20,20)
0.02 (19,20) (19,20) (20,20) (20,20) (20,20) (20,20)
0.03 (16,16) (16,16) (18,18) (18,18) (18,20) (18,20)
0.04 (6,16) (6,16) (5,20) (5,20) (4,20) (4,20)
0.05 (3,15) (9,9) (3,18) (3,18) (2,20) (2,20)
0.06 (3,11) (8,8) (2,16) (2,16) (1,20) (1,20)
0.07 (4,5) (6,6) (1,15) (8,8) (1,17) (1,17)
0.08 (3,4) (5,5) (1,14) (7,7) (1,16) (1,16)
0.09 (3,3) (4,4) (1,12) (5,5) (0,15) (0,15)
0.1 (2,3) (3,3) (1,9) (4,4) (0,15) (6,6)
0.11 (2,2) (3,3) (3,3) (4,4) (0,14) (5,5)
0.12 (2,2) (2,2) (2,3) (3,3) (0,13) (4,4)
0.13 (2,2) (2,2) (2,2) (3,3) (0,11) (4,4)
0.14 (1,2) (2,2) (2,2) (2,2) (0,9) (3,3)
0.15 (1,1) (2,2) (1,2) (2,2) (2,2) (3,3)
1. For an asymmetric mode, there is a second mode in which the installed 
bases of the two firms are reversed.
2. The cases in which there is a bimodal distribution for # = 0 and a
unimodal distribution for # = 1 are highlighted.
! = 2 ! = 3 ! = 4
Table 3. Mode of the limit distribution, v0 = 0, ! = 1.
"
